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Criminal Procedure/Constitutional Law-WARRANTLESS AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE AND THE OPEN VIEW DOCTRINE-Florida v. Riley, 109
S. Ct. 693 (1989)
JOHN R. DIXON
M ODERN police patrols in search of criminal activity are turn-
ing increasingly to the skies.' Aerial surveillance is an attrac-
tive investigative tool because it enables law enforcement -officials to
make observations they could not constitutionally obtain from
ground-level without a warrant.2 This unique ability of aerial sur-
veillance makes it both a boon to police investigation and an un-
precedented threat to individual privacy. Consequently, an
increasing number of courts have faced the issue of when a warrant-
less aerial surveillance constitutes an illegal search.3 In Florida v.
Riley,4 the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue and
held that warrantless aerial surveillance of a person's property and
home does not constitute a search when the aerial surveillance is
performed unintrusively and the area observed is in open view.'
This Note examines the use of aerial surveillance within the con-
text of fourth amendment 6 jurisprudence. Part I presents the facts
of the case and its prior judicial history. Part II reviews the histori-
cal development of fourth amendment jurisprudence and its subse-
quent refinement in Katz v. United States.' Part III examines the
different approaches courts have employed in analyzing aerial sur-
1. See Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for
the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 725 (1985).
2. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d
845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw.
412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
4. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
5. Id. at 696-97.
6. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CoN s. amend. IV.
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:157
veillance cases. Finally, Part IV criticizes the Court's decision in
Riley and offers an alternative analysis.
I. THE FACTS OF RILEY
Michael Riley lived on approximately five acres of rural property
in Pasco County, Florida.' Surrounding his property were many
trees and shrubs and a "DO NOT ENTER" sign which Riley had
posted in front of his mobile home. 9 Riley had also constructed a
wire fence which encompassed his property and a greenhouse lo-
cated ten to twenty feet behind the home. 10 Two sides of the green-
house were enclosed; the third side was obscured by trees and
shrubbery, and the fourth side was screened by the mobile home
and additional shrubbery." The roof of the greenhouse was com-
posed of a combination of opaque and translucent panels. Two of
these panels, which accounted for approximately ten percent of the
roof, were missing. 12
Acting solely on the basis of an anonymous tip, police made a
ground-level inspection of Riley's property from the road and the
adjacent property in search of marijuana. 3 Frustrated in their at-
tempt to view the contents of Riley's greenhouse from this vantage
point, the police decided to investigate from the air. 14 Armed with a
helicopter and a camera with a telephoto lens, the police maneu-
vered themselves 400 feet over Riley's greenhouse and home 5 and
photographed the premises.16 After circling back over the area a sec-
ond time, one officer believed he could identify marijuana in the
greenhouse through the missing roof panels and open sides. 7 Based
on this information, police obtained a search warrant and discov-
ered forty-four marijuana plants growing inside the greenhouse. 8
The trial court found the warrantless helicopter surveillance con-
stituted an illegal search and granted Riley's motion to suppress the
8. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 695 (1989).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. It was unclear whether the helicopter descended below 400 feet. Brief for Respon-
dent at 8, Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (No. 87-764).
16. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987). The police also photographed the green-
house from the air, but the trial judge appeared to accept that the marijuana was identified
with the officer's naked eye and not from the photographs. Id. at 283-84 n.2.
17. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695.
18. State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
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evidence.1 9 The District Court of Appeal reversed and certified the
case to the Supreme Court of Florida,20 which quashed the District
Court's decision and reinstated the suppression order. 2' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a bitterly divided
plurality opinion, reversed the Supreme Court of Florida. 22
II. HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
Traditionally, the fourth amendment has not been interpreted as a
proscription against all searches. Instead, the amendment prohibits
only those searches that are unreasonable.2 3 Warrantless searches
are considered presumptively unreasonable, with a few well-defined
exceptions. 24 Thus, the key issue in Riley was whether the warrant-
less helicopter surveillance constituted an unreasonable search.
A. The Trespass Doctrine and the Open Fields Exception
Prior to the Court's decision in Katz, 25 police surveillance was not
considered a search unless an actual physical invasion of a "consti-
tutionally protected area" occurred. 26 The home and its curtilage
were generally considered to be constitutionally protected areas. 27
This definition of a search had its roots in English common law.
English courts used a trespass standard to determine whether a per-
son's privacy rights had been violated. 2 This analysis was eventually
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1356-57.
21. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 289 (Fla. 1987).
22. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696.
23. See supra note 6.
24. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches); Chi-
mel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (car
searches).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (physical trespass
necessary for a search to be unreasonable); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)
(searchlight observation not a search because it does not physically trespass on the area ob-
served).
27. Curtilage has been defined as "a small piece of land, not necessarily inclosed,
around the dwelling house, and generally includes the buildings necessary for domestic pur-
poses .... [F]or search and seizure purposes [curtilage] includes those outbuildings which
are directly and intimately connected with the habitation .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
346 (5th ed. 1979). The concept of curtilage was originally used in common law burglary
cases to define the boundaries of the home. Since the punishment for burglary was hanging,
this was an extremely important distinction to make. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*223, *225, *226.
28. See Recent Developments- Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Anal-
ysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409, 412 n.14 (1982).
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applied to fourth amendment jurisprudence in the United States.2 9
Courts construed this trespass requirement literally, and nearly all
physically non-intrusive surveillance by police was permitted. For
example, in Olmstead v. United States0 the Supreme Court con-
fronted the difficulty of applying the trespass doctrine to a fourth
amendment search problem created by the advent of new technol-
ogy.3' The Court upheld the trespass analysis and found that tele-
phone wiretapping did not constitute a search because listening to a
phone conversation involved no actual physical invasion of a consti-
tutionally protected area.32
Four years prior to Olmstead, the Supreme Court recognized an
"open fields" exception to the trespass requirement which limited
the scope of fourth amendment protection. In Hester v. United
States,33 the Court held that a warrantless physical intrusion onto a
person's property would not be considered a search when it took
place in an open field.3 4 In Hester, revenue agents believed that the
defendant was part of an illegal bootlegging operation and put his
father's farm under surveillance. 5 During the stakeout, one agent
made a warrantless entry onto the property and saw Hester hand a
bottle to another person.3 6 When Hester realized the agent's pres-
ence, he grabbed another bottle and ran into an open field behind
the house, dropping the bottle during his escape.37 The pursuing
agents examined the broken bottle and discovered about a quart of
moonshine whiskey inside.38 Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes invoked a literal interpretation of the fourth amendment
and held that an open field merited no protection because it was not
a "person, house, paper, or effect." 3 9 The Hester Court's analysis
29. See cases cited supra note 26.
30. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
31. The government believed Olmstead was distributing illegal liquor in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. Id. In order to confirm their suspicions, and without committing
any trespass on the curtilage, the government officers inserted small wires into the telephone
line running to Olmstead's office and proceeded to monitor his calls. Id. at 456-57.
32. Id. at 464-66. In defining what is a constitutionally protected area, Chief Justice
Taft stated that any intrusion into the curtilage was equivalent to an intrusion into the home.
Id.
33. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
34. Id. at 59.
35. Id. at 58. The revenue agents were acting on a tip that the defendant was part of a
bootlegging operation. Id.
36. Id. The agent walked onto the property and positioned himself about 75 yards from
the house. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 59. Holmes based his definition of an open field on the common law concept
of curtilage, but failed to give any specific guidelines for determining where the curtilage
began or what the scope of this warrant exception would be. See id.
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circumvented the trespass doctrine and allowed police to make a
warrantless search of any area considered to be an open field.
40
B. Katz: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
As technology advanced, the use of electronic surveillance by law
enforcement became increasingly more widespread and intrusive.
Accordingly, a need arose for a new fourth amendment search anal-
ysis that could keep pace with this rapid increase in technology.
4 1
Responding to this need, the Supreme Court significantly extended
fourth amendment protection in Katz v. United States.
42
The Federal Bureau of Investigation suspected Katz was using a
public telephone booth to place illegal bets. 43 To confirm this suspi-
cion, an agent placed a sensitive listening and recording device out-
side the booth and monitored Katz's phone calls. 4 The government
argued to the United States Supreme Court that the agent's use of
the listening device did not constitute a search because the position
of the microphone was physically non-intrusive, and that the phone
booth could not be considered a "constitutionally protected area."
45
The Court rejected this argument and held the government's war-
rantless intrusion to be a search which violated Katz's expectation
of privacy.4 6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly re-
jected the trespass doctrine as controlling and stated that "the reach
of the [Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or ab-
sence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 47 The Court
also found the public location of the phone booth unimportant and
40. One commentator has suggested that the Court postulated the open fields exception
solely as a response to the defendant's claim that the examination of his abandoned bottle,
and not the entry into the field itself, was improper, "Thus, it is possible that all the Court
intended to say was that abandoned property found in an open field may be seized." Saltz-
burg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the
Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
41. The difficulty of logically applying the trespass doctrine to fourth amendment
search analysis became absurdly apparent in Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per
curiam), where the Court held that the physical intrusion requirement for a search was ful-
filled because the police had attached their microphone to a wall with a thumbtack. See also
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (use of a spike mike driven into the wall
constituted a physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area, but result might have
been different had the police merely leaned the mike against the wall).
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. Transmitting bets across state lines by telephone violated 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1967).
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
45. Id. at 351-52.
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id.
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rejected the constitutionally protected area doctrine, stating that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 48
While this decision overturned nearly 100 years of fourth amend-
ment precedent, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion produced the
test for determining whether a search had occurred. Harlan pro-
posed what is now referred to as the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test, ' 49 which asks, first, whether a person has exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy, and second, whether that expecta-
tion is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 0 When
both prongs of the Katz test are met, and no exigent circumstances
exist," then warrantless surveillance by the police is deemed uncon-
stitutional.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
While Katz was intended to ensure the vitality of fourth amend-
ment protection in the face of advancing technology, many courts
had difficulty applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to
aerial surveillance cases.5 2 Airplanes and helicopters were certainly
not "new technology," but the ways in which the government began
using these aircraft raised a novel question about whether it was
possible to have an expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance."
One of the more troubling aspects of aerial surveillance is that
virtually everything on the ground is exposed to some kind of view
from the air. This may be true even when objects or areas are well-
hidden from all ground-level vantage points. Thus, many courts
faced situations where a person clearly had a reasonable expectation
of privacy from warrantless ground-level searches. As a result, it
48. Id. at 351.
49. The term "reasorable expectation of privacy" was first employed by the Court in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). One commentator expressed disap-
proval with the subjective prong of the test noting that government could alter subjective
expectations of privacy by announcing a nation-wide surveillance program. See Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974). But see Com-
ment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 469
(1984) (subjective prong reasonable because it is unlikely that a person who does not exhibit
an actual expectation of privacy could reasonably have one).
51. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1209 (1984); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980); State v.
Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (government
surveillance of Dow's chemical plant with a $22,000 aerial mapping camera); Dean v. Supe-
rior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973) (government binocular
surveillance from an airplane flying at 300 feet).
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was necessary to determine if the required expectation of privacy
extended to aerial surveillance as well.14 In making this determina-
tion, courts divided as to whether the open fields doctrine had sur-
vived Katz, and, if so, whether the curtilage enjoyed any heightened
protection from aerial surveillance."
Courts dealt with this problem in one of three ways. Some rea-
soned Katz had rejected the plain language analysis of the fourth
amendment and that it was now possible for a person to entertain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a place not explicitly mentioned
by the fourth amendment.16 Other courts maintained that the "plain
language analysis" had survived Katz, and that it was necessary to
determine whether the area surveilled was in the curtilage or in an
open field before the Katz test could be applied. 7 The third analysis
went a step further and held that anything in open view, whether in
the curtilage or an open field, would receive no fourth amendment
protection8
A. The Pure Katz Analysis
Many courts believed that Katz greatly expanded the potential of
fourth amendment protection. 9 These courts often held that it was
54. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (a per-
son may have an expectation of privacy in an open field if society would consider it reasona-
ble); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (upholding
Katz test over open fields doctrine because police should not be given carte blanche to search
areas outside the curtilage); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 589 (1973) (Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test more appropriate because
open fields doctrine reminiscent of constitutionally protected areas approach); State v.
Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Fla. 1981) (open fields doctrine may receive fourth amend-
ment protection if it passes both prongs of Katz test).
56. See cases cited supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 1982) (no legitimate
expectation of privacy in an open field); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th
Cir. 1978) (distinguishing between open fields and curtilage useful in determining the exis-
tence of a reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); Izzard v.
State, 10 Ark. App. 265, 269, 663 S.W.2d 192, 194 (1984) (helicopter surveillance 100 feet
over marijuana patch not a search because people do not reasonably expect privacy in open
fields). Courts will often reject an expectation of privacy under the open fields exception and
then conclude there was also no reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz. See, e.g.,
Izzard v. State, 10 Ark. App. 265, 268-69, 663 S.W.2d 192, 195-96 (1984). This is largely a
moot exercise because once the court accepts the open fields doctrine as controlling, there is
no need to analyze privacy expectations further.
58. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal: Rptr. 764,
765 (1974) (inspection of auto body parts from the air not a search because parts were in
open view from neighbor's property); Randall v. State, 458 So. 2d 822, 825 (Fla. 2d DCA
1984) (aerial observation not a search because police saw what was in open view at a legally
permissible vantage point); State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 93, 621 P.2d 370, 373 (1980) (heli-
copter surveillance of greenhouse not a search because the structure was in open view).
59. See cases cited supra note 55.
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possible for a person to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
an open field or other publicly accessible area if both prongs of the
Katz test were satisfied. These courts either explicitly rejected the
open fields doctrine or held that it would apply only if the Katz test
was not met. 6o
For example, in People v. Sneed,61 the first aerial surveillance
case, a California appellate court held that a warrantless helicopter
observation twenty to twenty-five feet above an open field consti-
tuted an illegal search. Police had received a telephone tip that
Sneed was growing marijuana on his land. They subsequently flew
over a corral located 125 feet from Sneed's home. 62 While the corral
was arguably outside the curtilage, the court rejected the open fields
doctrine as a mechanical test that was no longer necessary in light of
Katz.63 Instead, the court held that it is possible to have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in an open field, or other area in open
view, depending on the circumstances of the surveillance.
64
B. Oliver: The Open Fields Analysis
Many courts insisted Hester65 had survived Katz and that the dis-
tinction between the curtilage and open fields had an important
bearing on the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy. 66
For example in Brennan v. State,67 police flew a helicopter at treetop
level over a heavily wooded section of appellant's rural property
and observed a marijuana patch approximately 150 yards from a
mobile home. 68 The court held that the appellant did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy from the helicopter surveillance be-
cause the area surveilled was an open field. 69
The Supreme Court resolved the open fields question in Oliver v.
United States.70 The Court reached back sixty years and invoked
60. Courts that did not reject the open fields doctrine often applied the Katz test incon-
sistently. See, e.g., United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (defendant
failed prong one because it is not possible to exhibit an intention to keep open field activities
to oneself); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (court failed to
address prong one and held that prong two was not met because society is unwilling to recog-
nize an expectation of privacy in an open field).
61. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1973).
62. Id. at 539-40, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
63. Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
64. Id.
65. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
66. See cases cited supra note 57.
67. 417 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), cert. dismissed, 447 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1984).
68. Id. at 1025.
69. Id. at 1026.
70. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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Hester's "plain language analysis" as support for its holding that
the fourth amendment was not designed to protect activities that
take place in open fields. 7 1 Oliver involved the consolidation of two
factually similar cases. 72 In both cases police made warrantless en-
tries onto the defendants' land, ignoring fences and "no trespass-
ing" signs in an attempt to verify tips that marijuana was being
grown on the property. 73 Applying the Katz test, the Court held that
society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable any expectation of
privacy in an open field.7 4 This bright-line rule has received much
criticism and has been compared to the constitutionally protected
areas doctrine that the Court rejected in Katz.75
While Oliver made it clear that open fields would receive no
fourth amendment protection from ground-level searches, it did not
specifically address the issue of aerial surveillance. 76 Many courts,
however, interpreted Oliver's approval of ground-level intrusions
into open fields as implicit approval of aerial intrusions, without
considering whether the Court's failure to specifically address aerial
surveillance suggested otherwise.7 7 These courts applied the open
fields doctrine to determine the extent of fourth amendment protec-
tion for ground-level searches as well as for aerial searches. 78 This
analysis first asks whether the area or object surveilled was within
the curtilage. Anything outside the curtilage is per se unprotected,
according to Hester, and observations of these areas will not consti-
tute a search. 79
71. Id. at 181.
72. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
73. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173-75.
74. Id. at 179.
75. See, e.g., Comment, A Privacy-Based Analysis for Warrantless Aerial Surveillance
Cases, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 1783 (1987); Comment, Supreme Court's Treatment of Open
Fields: A Comment on Oliver and Thornton, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 637, 667 (1984). The
Oliver Court offered no guidelines beyond the common law to determine where the curtilage
ends and where open fields begin. Prior to Oliver, many courts had a difficult time making
this distinction. See, e.g., DeMontmorency v. State, 401 So. 2d 858, 862-63 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) (court struggled with whether an area is an open field when a fence surrounds both it
and the dwelling), aff'd, 464 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1985).
76. The Court simply noted that the petitioner had conceded that the police could law-
fully survey his land from the air. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
77. See, e.g., National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp.
945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Note, Florida v. Brady: Can Katz Survive in Open
Fields?, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 921, 941. (1983).
78. See Note, supra note 1, at 751.
79. Id.
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Many courts that follow this per se approach do not apply the
Katz test. 80 In Masters v. State,8 police used a helicopter to hover
thirty feet over a backyard to observe a marijuana patch located
forty feet from the house. Despite the proximity of the marijuana to
the house, the court considered it to be in an open field and, there-
fore, held it was unprotected. In reaching this conclusion, the court
found it unnecessary to discuss Katz.82
However, the use of warrantless aerial surveillance remains a po-
tentially abusive investigative tool whether the area surveilled is an
open field or the curtilage. The most graphic example of this oc-
curred in National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Mullen, where the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held that persons living near sites of rural ma-
rijuana "gardens" were entitled to a preliminary injunction pre-
venting law enforcement personnel from conducting warrantless
searches and seizures and indiscriminate helicopter surveillance of
their homes and curtilages s3 Prior to this injunction, in a state-wide
program designed to locate marijuana farms, the police had used
helicopters to watch a woman using an outdoor shower, to chase
two twelve-year-old girls, and even to blow the toilet paper out of a
man's hand in his outhouse. 4 The court held that these warrantless
aerial surveillances were illegal searches when helicopter surveillance
took place over homes and curtilage, but not when conducted over
an open field.85
While Oliver's open fields analysis implies that the curtilage re-
ceives heightened protection, it says very little about the relationship
between this heightened protection and warrantless aerial surveil-
lance.8 6 Some courts have found that distinguishing between curti-
80. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865
(1974) (Katz not cited by Court holding warrantless entry on factory grounds not a search
because open fields receive no fourth amendment protection); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 429, 431, 389 N.E.2d 888, 893 (1979) (warrantless aerial surveillance of open field
constitutional and did not require a Katz analysis), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980). Those
courts that do address Katz often fail to fully consider both prongs of the test. See, e.g.,
United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983) (court mentioned Katz test
but found it unnecessary to apply the first prong because a person cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an open field), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984).
81. 453 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
82. Id. at 184. The court found the marijuana was in an open field because the mari-
juana was not inside a fenced area and the field was used for commercial rather than domes-
tic purposes. Id.
83. 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
84. Id. at 955, 958.
85. Id. at 965.
86. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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lage and non-curtilage areas in aerial surveillance cases is a pointless
task because both areas are equally visible from the air. 7 Such ex-
posed curtilage areas could not be denied fourth amendment protec-
tion under the open fields doctrine, so an increasing number of
courts began to use the open view doctrine to severely limit fourth
amendment protection. 8
C. The Open View Analysis
Use of the open view doctrine in aerial surveillance cases poses a
unique problem for the Katz test: when can a person have a reason-
able expectation of privacy from aerial observations? The answer to
this question ultimately turns on how a court defines "open
view." 8 9 This is an important determination to make because open
view observations are not considered searches for fourth amend-
ment purposes.90 Ironically, the open view doctrine had its origin in
Katz, where Justice Harlan noted that a person could not have an
expectation of privacy in something that the person knowingly ex-
posed to public view. 9' Thus many courts consider an object or area
to be in open view when the police are able to see the area or object
equally as well as the public. 92
The open view doctrine has proved to be a powerful restraint on
Katz. Courts invoking this doctrine often consider a Katz analysis
unnecessary or find that the defendant fails the expectation of pri-
vacy on one or both prongs of the test. 93 The first prong of Katz
87. See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (D. Me. 1985) ("there
would appear to be no sound basis for distinguishing between 'curtilage' and 'noncurtilage'
areas equally visible from the air"), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022
(1987).
88. See cases cited supra note 58.
89. For an excellent discussion of the open view doctrine, see generally Comment, Re-
viving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the Open View Doctrine: Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191 (1988).
90. The open view doctrine is distinct from the plain view doctrine. The latter is an
exception to the fourth amendment requirement that search warrants list with specificity the
items to be seized. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971). The
plain view doctrine arises when an officer executing a search warrant discovers incriminating
evidence in plain view. Id. at 465. The officer must be executing a search warrant, the dis-
covery of the evidence must be inadvertent, and its incriminating nature must be in plain
view. Id. at 469-71. Under the open view doctrine officers may view an area that a dweller
knowingly leaves open to public view. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924);
Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1968).
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 389, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. See cases cited supra note 58.
93. See, e.g., People v. Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 581, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1988) (defen-
dant's subjective expectation of privacy not reasonable because the observation was made
from legal vantage point).
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requires a person to physically exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy. 94 This usually involves erecting fences, posting signs and
locking gates. Whether a person has exhibited a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy from aerial surveillance has been answered in one of
two ways. Several courts have held that when a person has ade-
quately blocked all ground-level observation, this will be sufficient
evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy from aerial observa-
tion as well. 95 Other courts have held that merely blocking all
ground level observation is not enough and that, instead, a person
must actually shield the area from aerial view. 96
The second prong of the Katz test asks whether society would
consider the person's subjective expectation of privacy to be reason-
able. 97 This standard simply evaluates the person's actions and asks
whether it is reasonable to assume others will honor the expectation
of privacy. Courts have employed two methods of analysis to make
this determination in aerial surveillance cases: the reasonably curi-
ous passerby approach 98 and the legal vantage point approach. 99
1. Reasonably Curious Passerby
Many courts have used a "reasonably curious passerby" standard
to determine whether an object or an area is in open view.' °° This
test asks whether the conduct of the police was sufficiently like that
of a reasonably curious private citizen. Any subjective expectation
of privacy a person had under prong one of the Katz test is consid-
ered unreasonable if the area could be viewed by a reasonably curi-
ous passerby in the air. °'0 Courts consider a variety of factors in
94. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 792-93 (E.D. Cal. 1985)
(defendant blocked all ground-level views of his greenhouse), rev'd, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.
1986).
96. See, e.g., State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (inability to view
areas from the ground not significant); State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tenn. 1982)
(protecting against earthly intrusions is not enough).
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
98. See, e.g., Giancola v. West Virginia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 551 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277
S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981).
99. See, e.g., People v. Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 581, 588, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805
(1988) (reasonableness of expectation based on whether aerial surveillance occurred at legal
altitude and was performed non-intrusively); Diehl v. State, 461 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (aerial observation of marijuana patch in open field constitutional because it was
from a lawful vantage point).
100. See cases cited supra note 98.
101. See id.
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determining whether the observation of the passerby was reasona-
ble. For example, in United States v. Bassford'0 2 the court held that
a warrantless aerial surveillance conducted 1000 feet over a defen-
dant's property was permissible because the plane had flown at a
legal altitude and made only two passes over the property, and be-
cause the duration of each pass was minimal. 1°3 The court concluded
that it was unreasonable for the defendant to expect that people
would not fly over his property in this manner and inspect the con-
tents of his fields.o4
2. Legal Vantage Point
The second method of open view analysis asks whether the van-
tage point of the police surveillance was legal and non-intrusive.
Under this test, the open view status of an object or area turns al-
most entirely on whether the police were where they had a legal right
to be.105 This analysis gives an extremely broad interpretation to the
reasonably curious passerby standard. Exposure of any part of the
curtilage, no matter how small, is considered equivalent to unlim-
ited exposure to all types of aerial observations so long as the aerial
observations are made from a legal altitude. 0 6 Courts using this le-
gal vantage point standard often cite duration, frequency and dan-
gerousness of the flight as the important factors; 0 7 however, few
courts have found a warrantless aerial surveillance actually consti-
tuted an illegal search because of these factors. 108 Instead, most
courts use these factors to illustrate why the surveillance did not
constitute a search.10 9
102. 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 1331.
104. Id. at 1331-32.
105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
106. See Note, Criminal Procedure- Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Endorsed--Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 497, 510 (1987).
107. See, e.g., Giacola v. West Virginia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547 (4th Cir.
1987).
108. But see People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy from noisy, dangerous helicopter intrusions even
though he had not fully met both prongs of the Katz test), rev'd, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 710 P.2d 299 (1988).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (constant
surveillance of ranch over three-week period not violative of defendant's expectation of pri-
vacy), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). But see, Note, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the
Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271, 279 (1981) (if aerial surveillance considered
routine, a person could never fulfill prong one of the Katz test because increasing the num-
ber of flights would decrease the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy).
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When the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of aerial sur-
veillance in California v. Ciraolo,II0 it placed great emphasis on the
legal vantage point of the observation."' The Court invoked the
open view doctrine and held that the warrantless aerial surveillance
of a fenced backyard was not an illegal search because the police
were in publicly navigable airspace." 12 The Court found that because
this is an age where commercial planes may routinely fly over the
backyard, Ciraolo could not reasonably have expected the area to be
protected from aerial inspection by the police." 3 The Court equated
partial exposure to some types of aerial surveillance with full expo-
sure to police investigation at a legal altitude. 1 4 Despite the Court's
reasoning in Ciraolo, it is not clear why the mere legality of an air-
craft's position and activity is relevant to determining the reasona-
bleness of a person's expectation of privacy.
IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RILEY
In denying Riley's motion to suppress, the Supreme Court did lit-
tle to answer the question of why the legality of a plane's position
should determine the reasonableness of a person's expectation of
privacy. Indeed, the Court's two-and-one-half page plurality opin-
ion did little more than echo the reasoning of Ciraolo."5s The Court
held that the warrantless aerial surveillance of Riley's greenhouse
did not constitute an illegal search because its contents were in open
view. 116 In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceded that the
greenhouse was within the curtilage but reiterated its reasoning from
110. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
111. Id. at 213. Police had received an anonymous telephone tip that Ciraolo was grow-
ing marijuana in his backyard. Unable to view the contents of the yard from the ground due
to a ten-foot high inner fence and a six-foot high outer fence, the police procured an airplane
and flew over Ciraolo's property at an altitude of 1000 feet. During this flight, police made
photographs of Ciraolo's backyard and the yards of Ciraolo's neighbors. Id. at 209.
112. Id. at 213. See also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). Dow,
decided on the same day as Ciraolo, held that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
warrantless aerial surveillance of Dow's chemical plant did not constitute an illegal search.
After being denied a second on-site inspection, the EPA hired a pilot to fly over and photo-
graph Dow's plant with a $22,000 aerial mapping camera. Id. at 229. The Court rejected
Dow's claim that the area observed and photographed was "industrial curtilage" which had
been invaded. Id. at 235. The Court held the surveillance did not constitute a search because
the photographs were taken at a legal altitude, and -[a]ny person with an airplane and an
aerial camera could readily duplicate them." Id. at 231.
113. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
114. Id. at 213.
115. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 695-96 (1989).
116. Id. at 696.
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Ciraolo that "the home and its curtilage are not necessarily pro-
tected from inspection that involves no physical invasion."" 7
The plurality invoked the open view doctrine and used the legal
vantage point approach to find that Riley had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from aerial surveillance.' 8 In adopting the broad
definition of open view used in legal vantage point analysis, the
Court almost completely destroyed any meaningful application of
the Katz test. The Court's meager Katz analysis first noted that
Riley had exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy from
ground-level intrusions, but concluded that Riley had failed to ex-
hibit a subjective expectation of privacy from aerial observations
because of the hole in the greenhouse roof. 1 9 The Court concluded
that this opening placed the contents of the greenhouse in open view
of the public, and therefore that Riley could not have reasonably
expected his greenhouse to be free from aerial surveillance by the
police. 120
The Court's legal vantage point analysis contains three major
flaws. First, the analysis places too much emphasis on the legal alti-
tude of the flight. 12 1 The Court reasons that the warrantless inspec-
tion of Riley's property was permissible because it took place in
publicly navigable airspace. 22 The plurality thus defines open view
as anything that can be seen from a legal altitude according to Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.123
Use of FAA regulations as a bright-line rule for determining what
is in open view presents several problems. First, FAA altitude regu-
lations are not designed to determine reasonable expectations of pri-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The trial court found that Riley did not knowingly expose the contents of the green-
house to public view because the opening in the roof was meant not for public inspection but
to let in sunlight and rain. State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting
the trial court).
121. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations provide that airplanes may be
flown no lower than 1000 feet from the highest object in congested areas and no lower than
500 feet in non-congested areas. Helicopters may operate at lower altitudes provided they do
so without endangering people or property below. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1988).
122. The Court noted that if the helicopter had been flying at an illegal altitude, then a
different result would have been mandated. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989).
123. This line of reasoning has received much criticism. See, e.g., Dean v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973) (observer's altitude is a
minor consideration because sophisticated technology allows intrusions from almost any
height); LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 300 (1986) ("[Tlhis limitation upon the Ciraolo holding seems
to me about as shaky as Don Knotts.").
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vacy, but rather to promote air safety. 24 Second, because FAA
regulations distinguish between different types of aircraft, an alti-
tude test would dictate the amount of protection based on the air-
craft being used. 125 As Justice Brennan pointed out, the result of the
Court's holding is that Riley may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy from airplanes flying at 400 feet but not from helicopters
flying at the same height. 126 This result is ironic because a helicop-
ter's unique ability to hover over an area for long periods of time
makes it a potentially far more intrusive device than an airplane.
Furthermore, the legal right to fly a helicopter 400 feet over some-
one's property does not address the issue of how many people actu-
ally do this, and ultimately, whether such activity by the police is
reasonable. The mere prevalence of commercial air travel should not
translate into a rule that someone who maneuvers a helicopter 400
feet over another's property with the sole intention of looking
through the roof of that person's greenhouse is behaving in a rea-
sonable manner. According to the Court's "Peeping Tom" stan-
dard, we are all angling and maneuvering our helicopters over the
property of total strangers in an attempt to inspect the contents of
their outbuildings or the activity on their patios. Surely it is ques-
tionable whether this is a standard of behavior that society would
consider reasonable.
The second flaw in the Court's open view analysis is the assump-
tion that any member of the public flying in legal airspace over Ri-
ley's greenhouse could have seen what the police saw. 27 The Court
cites Ciraolo for the proposition that commercial flight is routine
and notes "there is no indication that such flights are unheard of in
Pasco County, Florida.' ' 28 The Court does not acknowledge the
qualitative difference that exists between an observation made by a
passenger on a commercial airliner and a focused police inspection
over an individual's property. 29 The mere fact that a private citizen
124. See State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. 827, 831, 621 P.2d 492, 494 (1981).
125. Id.
126. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 700-01 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 696.
128. Id.; see also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(no search because a private pilot could have seen the marijuana field and notified the po-
lice); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 417, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328-29 (1977) (observation of
defendant's curtilage from a helicopter that dropped down to 300 feet not a search because
cropdusters occasionally flew over the property); Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind.
1985) (observations from an airplane circling defendant's greenhouse and taking pictures at
800 feet not a search because any casual observer flying over the property could have seen
what the police saw).
129. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985)
[Vol. 17:157
19891 WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
is at a legal altitude says nothing about what that person could actu-
ally see from that height. The view from a commercial airliner that
the public has of an area on the ground is usually fleeting and anon-
ymous. 30 The police, however, knew that the home and yard they
were inspecting was Riley's, and they knew they were looking for
marijuana.
The Court's reasoning is based on the assumption that the limited
exposure of one's property to some kinds of aerial view is equivalent
to full exposure to all types of aerial surveillance. 1 ' The obvious
fault of such logic is that there exists no reason to believe that pri-
vate citizens flying overhead scrutinize the land below in search of
criminal activity. 32 As one commentator has aptly noted, "[a] prop-
erty owner would not expect a cropduster to be searching, only that
he would be cropdusting."'' 3 The more focused nature of the police
surveillance and the special maneuvers necessary to observe an area
both are indications that the area is not really in open view because
such viewing behavior is contrary to typical public activity. 3 4 Sim-
ply asking if the police were where they had a legal right to be is not
enough. Instead, courts must ask whether the vantage point of the
police is truly a public one. I"
(the occasional glance of a passing pilot does not diminish the demand that police refrain
from examining the details of a person's backyard from the air); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (consent to certain observations not consent to all
kinds of observations, especially by government agents), rev'd, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 710 P.2d 299 (1988).
130. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223-24 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("the
actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent" and
"too trivial to protect against").
131. See Note, supra note 106, at 510.
132. See Note, supra note 109, at 284.
133. Id.
134. This is not to say that simply because the public may not know what they see is
marijuana that the substance is not in open view. The point is this: first, the public is not in a
position to recognize anything at such a height; and second, in order to view the interior of
the greenhouse, the public would have to engage in behavior that is contrary to normal pub-
lic activity. For example, in United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich.
1980), police trained in spotting marijuana from the air could not do so at a height of 200
feet and felt compelled to drop down to 50 feet. Id. at 1079. If ordinary citizens, lacking the
police's special expertise, were flying over the same property, these citizens would have to fly
at least this low, if not lower, in order to recognize the substance as marijuana. The necessity
of such special maneuvering indicates that the marijuana was not really in open view at all.
See also State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1097-98 (Fla. 1982) (the property was not in public
view because the police had to go to great lengths to obtain their view).
135. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at
351. See also People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985) (it is
entirely possible to have an expectation of privacy from directed police surveillance as op-
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's holding is that
the home and its curtilage will receive no protection from non-intru-
sive aerial invasions. 3 6 The Court's ruling that a warrantless aerial
surveillance does not constitute a search when it is performed in a
non-intrusive manner ignores the basic principle of Katz.3 7 The
Riley Court placed too much emphasis on the fact that the surveil-
lance occurred from a legally permissible altitude, did not blow up
wind or dust, and did not endanger people or buildings below.' 38
The Court concluded that Riley would have had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from illegally low, noisy or intrusive aerial surveil-
lance, but not from any aerial surveillance performed at a legal
altitude. 13 9 This distinction reveals a disingenuous application of the
trespass doctrine cloaked in the language of Katz. Katz rejected the
trespass doctrine as a mechanical test which allowed the existence of
fourth amendment protection to turn solely on the degree of govern-
mental intrusion. 40 Similarly, the fact that the helicopter might not
blow up wind or dust, or physically endanger people should have no
bearing on whether the surveillance that was achieved with its use
constituted a search.' 14
Katz recognized that it is entirely possible to perform a search
that violates the fourth amendment without someone ever being
aware that a search is taking place. 42 Accordingly, the reasonable-
ness of a person's expectation of privacy should not be determined
by asking whether the person anticipated the use of some novel sur-
veillance technique which does not physically disturb that person's
property. The fourth amendment does not maintain that we are sub-
ject to inspection by all surveillance tactics we have failed to
block. 43 If it did, our expectations of privacy would be defined by
posed to the haphazard glance of private plane's pilot); Note, supra note 106, at 285 (while
there might not be a reasonable expectation of privacy against a child wandering into a back-
yard, there may be one against the police making a search of the same area).
136. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989).
137. Katz explicitly rejected consideration of the intrusiveness of the police activity:
"[Tihat the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the
wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance." Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
138. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697.
139. Id.
140. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. See also Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 426 (use of
altitude as reasonable expectation of privacy determinant similar to use of the degree of the
physical intrusion in common law trespass doctrine.)
141. These factors may be appropriate considerations for determining whether an already
warranted search is conducted reasonably, but they are of extremely limited value in deter-
mining whether a search has taken place.
142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
143. See People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 382, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505
(1985).
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the capabilities of the latest technology. The Katz decision recog-
nized that the fourth amendment goes deeper than this and is meant
to protect against warrantless searches that are repugnant to the pri-
vacy values of the people.
Riley is a continuation of the Rehnquist Court's enlargement of
the scope of the open view doctrine. 144 With one deft stroke, the
Court has dictated that the curtilage will receive no more protection
than an open field whenever it is possible to view the contents of the
curtilage from the air. 145 As a result, law enforcement officials may
now observe with impunity all activity in our backyards, on our pat-
ios, and in any other area we have failed to completely seal off from
aerial view. 
146
The Court's decision simultaneously broadens the scope of the
open view doctrine and emasculates Katz. If the Katz test is to have
the power and flexibility the Court originally intended it to have,
then our expectations of privacy cannot be slaves to technology and
clever surveillance tactics. When a person has satisfied prong one of
the Katz test, that is, has shown an expectation of privacy from
ground-level surveillance, this manifestation of a privacy expecta-
tion should suffice as to aerial inspection as well. Furthermore,
prong two should be satisfied if law enforcement's view really was
from a public vantage point and not by a mechanical application of
FAA regulations. As Professor Amsterdam pointed out, these ques-
tions are value judgments. We must ask if we want to live in a soci-
ety where this type of police activity is acceptable. 147
V. CONCLUSION
Florida v. Riley148 is virtually a rubber stamp of approval for any
warrantless aerial surveillance which meets FAA regulations. While
the Court's ruling was undoubtedly influenced by the war on drugs,
the implications of the decision extend much further than to the ille-
gal marijuana farmer. Police may now inspect and photograph not
only the property of a criminal suspect but also the property of in-
144. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Note, supra note 106, at 510-11.
145. See Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: Searching for Constitutional Stan-
dards, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 257, 295 (1986).
146. There also appears to be no limit to what the police may view. For example, it now
appears that police may legally observe a woman through a bathroom skylight located in an
outbuilding, even if the building is within the curtilage. Under Riley she would have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for any activity in the bathroom because the skylight would
afford an "open view" to all aircraft passing over her property.
147. See Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 386.
148. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
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nocent neighbors as well. Furthermore, the Court's non-intrusive-
ness standard seriously undermines the Katz doctrine and is a step
back to the more mechanical trespass analysis.
The Court's "what you don't know won't hurt you" approach to
aerial surveillance violates the spirit of Katz and the fourth amend-
ment. Something is fundamentally unsettling about stealthy, non-
intrusive surveillance performed without the awareness of the party
being watched. Furthermore, the Court's open view interpretation
will force those who do not wish to be subject to the indiscriminate
eye of the police to take drastic measures to ensure their privacy. As
one court has noted "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not set up a
contest between government and private citizen to test which party
can outmaneuver the other in a game of hide and seek.'" 49 The Su-
preme Court has made it clear, however, that those who do not
want to play that game will receive no fourth amendment protection
from aerial surveillance.
149. United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 792 (E.D. Calif. 1985), rev'd, 805
F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986).
